Insight report: AQAP very likely to encourage further popular protests in Hadramawt as Yemeni factions compete for influence over governorate
Intelligence requirement/question
- What capabilities does Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) possess and what influence does the group have amid Yemen’s civil conflict?
- What progress has the Southern Transitional Council (STC) made towards its secessionist campaign for an independent southern Yemen?
On 7 August, AQAP’s Al-Malahim media wing published a video on its Rocketchat and Chirpwire profiles titled, ‘When Hadramawt was deceived in the name of ‘liberation’’. According to an 8 August report by BBC Monitoring, the video claimed that when AQAP controlled the Hadrami city of Al Mukalla between April 2015 and April 2016, “there were no exorbitant electricity bills, public services worked, marketplaces thrived, and people lived off their own bounty”. AQAP then presented “widespread poverty, unpaid wages, water and power shortages” as the consequences of Al Mukalla’s liberation from AQAP’s governance by the Yemeni armed forces (YAF) and southern militias, along with “hunger … failing services, humiliation, and mercenaries”, a reference to the armed forces of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and the STC, which are supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) respectively.
On 9 August, AQAP published a statement titled ‘On the events in Hadramawt’, referring to the series of popular protests, which have occurred across the governorate since 20 July. AQAP spoke of an “uprising against injustice and tyranny” and encouraged the demonstrations to continue “until all tyrants and traitors are removed” from Hadramawt.
Significance
The tone of AQAP’s video and statement mirrors the group’s previous propaganda, seeking to position itself as a legitimate representative of the Yemeni people. On 10 March, AQAP released a short video on its Telegram and Rocketchat channels titled ‘The Sickness and the Cure‘, which similarly called for the Yemeni people to reject “tyrant” leaders, according to an 11 March report by BBC Monitoring. Operationally, AQAP remains constrained to Yemen’s southern Abyan and Shabwa governorates by STC counter-terrorism efforts since August 2022, but its propaganda allows the group to maintain its outreach to the broader Yemeni population.
The Hadrami protests occurred in cities and towns across the governorate including the capital, Al Mukalla, as well Al Qatn, Al Shihr, Seiyun, and Tarim. The principal grievances involve the deterioration in the provision of basic services, rising prices of goods, and failing electricity supplies, which has resulted in power cuts lasting “more than 15 hours a day, coinciding with a severe heat wave hitting the city”, according to a 21 July report by the Khabar News Agency.
On 20 July, Hadramawt Coast Electricity Company (HCEC) released a statement regarding the disruption to the supply of fuel reaching Hadrami power stations, equivalent to a deficit of more than 300,000 barrels of diesel fuel in an unspecified time period, or representing “a 44% deficit in the required fuel quantities”. On 27 July, HCEC warned that Al Mukalla was at risk of entering “into complete darkness”, according to a 27 July report by Yemen Daily News.
Protests in Hadramawt governorate, 20 July to 12 August 2025. Image credit: Janes
In response to the ongoing power cuts, protesters in Al Mukalla “blocked roads and prevented trucks and vehicles from passing” on 27 July, according to a 28 July report by the South24 Center for News and Studies. Similar protests occurred between 28 and 31 July, both in Al Mukalla and other Hadrami cities. On 29 July, protesters in Seiyun called for the removal of the Governor of Hadramawt, Mabkhout bin Madi, and “the accountability of … corrupt officials within the local authority”, according to a 29 July report by Yemen Monitor.
Hadramawt security committee warns of incitement and interference
On 29 July, the Hadramawt Security Committee warned of “malicious hands” seeking to deliberately deprive power stations of the necessary fuel supplies. This mirrors HCEC’s 20 July statement, which included an appeal to “tribal points to allow fuel supply to alleviate citizens’ suffering”, potentially suggesting interference with fuel supplies by the Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy (HTC), also known as the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA). Janes has previously reported the HTC’s interference with crude oil exports from Hadramawt in February 2025. This weaponised interference threatened Yemen’s interim capital, Aden, with power cuts, as the HTC sought to agitate for Hadramawt’s political interests.
For more information, please see Ministry of health warning demonstrates instability of Yemen's political and socio-economic landscapes.
Subsequently, in a 31 July meeting, the Deputy Head of the Security Committee and Commander of the Second Military Region (SMR), Major General Talib Saeed Bargash, also reported that non-state armed groups (NSAGs), including AQAP and Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthis), sought to infiltrate and escalate the protests by “distributing money to incite young people to riot and carry out attacks”, according to a 31 July report by Yemen Monitor.
Clampdown by security forces escalates tensions
On 31 July, a protester, identified as Mohammad Saeed Yadin, was shot by security forces in the city of Tarim. According to a press statement by the Tarim police, quoted by the Al-Arab news outlet on 1 August, Yadin died from injuries sustained when, “while attempting to open the roads … security personnel fired a single warning shot into the air to disperse the crowd, but a citizen was accidentally injured”. A 10 August report by the South24 Center for News and Studies identified the security forces involved as affiliated with the First Military Region (FMR), aligned with Yemen’s executive PLC and supported by Saudi Arabia.
Cars and cargo trucks at a roadblock in the city of Tarim on 16 September 2021 during previous protests against increased costs of living and deterioration of services and security. Image credit: AFP via Getty Images
Subsequently, on 7 August, security forces “fired live ammunition and tear gas” to disperse protesters in Tarim “wounding two individuals”, according to an 8 August report by the South24 Center for News and Studies. The actions of the FMR-affiliated soldiers prompted condemnation from other Yemeni political factions competing for political influence over Hadramawt.
On 7 August, the STC’s Hadramawt branch condemned what it described as “the brutal repression and blatant assault on the people of Tarim” by the FMR. Furthermore, the STC called for “the immediate withdrawal … [of FMR forces] … and the empowerment of the people of the governorate to manage their own security through the Hadrami Elite Forces [HEF]” affiliated with the STC, which continues to pursue the restoration of an independent South Yemen, including Hadramawt.
Meanwhile, the HTC announced on 9 August its rejection of “military assaults on Tarim citizens” and warned that “any attack on Tarim residents is an attack on the alliance”, according to a 9 August report by the South24 Center for News and Studies. As Janes previously reported in its Yemen conflict spotlight: June–July 2025, the HTC’s leader, Sheikh Amr bin Habrish al-Ali, sought to establish Hadrami armed forces loyal to the HTC in an effort to redress the balance of power in the governorate.
For more information, please see Insight report: AQAP very likely to encourage further popular protests in Hadramawt as Yemeni factions compete for influence over governorate
