Israeli strikes against Iranian military officials, military sites, and nuclear infrastructure very likely to lead to tit-for-tat dynamic in immediate to short term

Events

• At approximately 0345 h local time the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it had launched “a precise and integrated pre-emptive strike based on high-quality intelligence, with the aim of hitting Iran’s nuclear programme and in response to the Iranian regime’s ongoing aggression against Israel”. The IDF added that the strike involved “dozens of aircraft” that struck “dozens of military targets, including nuclear targets in various areas of Iran” and that it “is conducting a lengthy process of assessments and preparations for the campaign”.
• At 0447 h local time Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the commencement of Operation ‘Rising Lion’ against Iran and stated that it will “continue for as many days as it takes to remove this threat”.
  

Significance

• The Israeli attack follows five rounds of negotiations between Iran and the United States since April surrounding Tehran’s nuclear programme and coincides with the expiration of a 60-day deadline imposed by US President Donald Trump on Tehran to agree to a nuclear deal. It also follows Trump’s remarks to The New York Times on 11 June that he is “less confident” about reaching such a deal with Iran.
• Strikes against Natanz and in particular the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) have almost certainly dealt a significant blow to Iran’s enrichment capabilities and facilities. While there is a low risk of radiation exposure, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed was low at the time of publication, there is a chemical risk associated with the UF6 that these facilities use, and the site will very likely be difficult to access in the immediate term.
  

Outlook

• If Iran continues to retaliate, as seems likely, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) will move to a more defensive posture aimed at suppressing Iran’s long-range weapons capabilities and the air defences that protect them.
• This will initially include known missile bases, early warning radars, and surface-to-air missile sites, but is likely to increasingly shift to attacking mobile assets that the Iranians will attempt to disperse.
• The IAF’s ability to maintain aircraft within strike range of such time-sensitive targets is limited by its small fleet of ageing aerial refuelling tankers, so its resources will likely be increasingly committed to this aspect of the operation.
• It is almost certain that Iranian attacks on Israel will be responded to by further Israeli strikes on Iran’s military sites, especially those related to ballistic missile operations and air defence, thus prompting a tit-for-tat dynamic in hostilities.
• This is also evidenced by Israeli statements detailing “preparations” and a protracted conflict spanning over the coming days.
• Iraq: While Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have not issued a statement on the Israeli strikes at the time of publication, it remains likely that they will undertake projectile and/or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks targeting US diplomatic and/or military facilities in the country.
• Gulf: Iran is unlikely in the immediate term to respond by conducting UAV or missile strikes against the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Kuwait.
• Hizbullah: Due to Lebanese government statements urging Hizbullah not to attack Israel, alongside preliminary statements by a Hizbullah official indicating the same, Janes assesses that it is unlikely that Hizbullah will attack Israel in the immediate term.